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ASBESTOS AND THE DALKON SHIELD: 
CORPORATE AMERICA ON TRIAL 
Joseph A. Page* 
AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON 
SHIELD. By Morton Mintz. New York: Pantheon Books. 1985. Pp. 
xvii, 308. $17.95. 
OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE AsBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL. 
By Paul Brodeur. New York: Pantheon Books. 1985. Pp. viii, 374. 
$19.95. 
Asbestos and the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device share a 
number of unhappy distinctions. Both products have exacted a terri-
ble human toll. 1 Damage suits seeking recovery for harm linked to 
both have put considerable strain on the judicial system.2 Corporate 
decisions made in the course of marketing both have been deemed rep-
rehensible. 3 Manufacturers of both have sought refuge in bank-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1955, LL.B. 1958, LL.M. 
1964, Harvard University. - Ed. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Christine 
A. Markman and Doriane Lambelet, Class of 1988, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1. [W]e estimate that 8,800 asbestos-related cancer deaths are occurring this year. The 
toll will rise to about 10,000 annually by the year 2000, and will continue until the year 
2030, all from exposures that took place prior to 1980. Overall, it is estimated that 350,000 
deaths will occur before the toll from these exposures is ended unless some intervention is 
developed to prevent the inevitable mortality . 
. . . One can estimate, and here the estimates are much more uncertain, that there will be 
200,000 or 300,000 individuals, perhaps even more that will suffer significant impairment or 
disability from the consequences of asbestos exposure. 
Investigation as to Whether or Not There is a National Asbestos Crisis; and if so, What Should Be 
Done About It: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and 
Human Resources. 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984) (statement of William J. Nicholson, Ph.D., 
Environmental Sciences Laboratory, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, City University of New 
York). A more conservative projection foresees from 74,000 to 265,000 deaths over the next 
thirty years. J. KAKALJK, P. EBENER, w. FELSTINER & M. SHANLEY, Cosrs OP AsBESTOS 
LmGATION 3 (Rand Institute of Civil Justice Pub. No. R-3042-ICJ, 1983). 
In At Any Cost, Mintz estimates that tens of thousands of women have been seriously injured 
by the Dalkon Shield: 66,000 women who conceived while wearing the Shield miscarried, while 
248 endured septic spontaneous abortions, of which 15 were fatal. Pp. 34. No one knows the 
extent of the damage inflicted by the 800,000 to one million Shields distributed and implanted 
abroad. P. 4. 
2. See generally Bruck, The Armies of Asbestos, AM. LAW., Nov. 1979, at 19; Chen, Asbestos 
Litigation is a Growth Industry, ATLANTIC, July 1984, at 24; Wellington, Asbestos: The Private 
Management of a Public Problem, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 375 (1984-1985); Masters, Asbestos 
Liability Suits Strain Manufacturers, Court System, Legal Times, Mar. 30, 1981, at 1, col. 2. 
On the Dalkon Shield, see Bamford, Dalkon Shield Starts Losing in Court, AM. LAW., July 
1980, at 31; Courie, The A.H. Robins Saga, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1986, at 56; Middleton, Robins 
Mounts Drive to Settle Dalkon Suits, Natl. L.J., Dec. 24, 1984, at 1, col. 3. 
3. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 
1324 
April-May 1987] Asbestos and the Dalkon Shield 1325 
ruptcy.4 And both have provided the grist for hard-hitting books by 
veteran investigative journalists. 
Paul Brodeur's Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos Industry on 
Trial returns a harsh verdict against the Manville Corporation and 
others directly and indirectly involved in the production of what was 
once called the "magic mineral."5 Morton Mintz makes a similar 
finding with respect to the A.H. Robins Company in At Any Cost: 
Corporate Greed, Women, and the Dalkon Shield. 6 
Both men are thoroughly familiar with their subjects. Brodeur, a 
staff writer for The New Yorker, has published several books on asbes-
tos. 7 As an investigative reporter for The Washington Post, Mintz has 
long prowled the pharmaceutical industry beat. 8 
This review will first briefly evaluate the books on their own terms 
and then comment upon their contributions to an understanding of 
tort law and the torts process. Their relevance to the current "liability 
crisis" will receive special attention. 
I 
Effective muckraking dramatizes the existence of a serious social 
problem and casts light upon those responsible for causing it. The 
muckraker characteristically tends to be compassionate, identifying 
with the friendless and voiceless victims of society's indifference or 
worse. 9 Thus, by definition this genre of writing is tendentious. But if 
factually honest, skil1fully crafted, and as persuasive as fervent in its 
denunciations of malfeasance and nonfeasance, it serves a noble pur-
pose in bringing to the public agenda injustices which cry out for 
redress. 
Brodeur and Mintz are contemporary practitioners of the muck-
raker's art. 10 Although the perils of asbestos and the Dalkon Shield 
S. Ct. 3339 (1986) Gury had adequate basis for concluding that defendant demonstrated gross 
disregard for safety of shipyard worker); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984) 
Gury could find beyond reasonable doubt that defendant's conduct evidenced wanton and reck-
less disregard for plaintiff's rights). 
4. On the asbestos bankruptcy, see Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and 
Political Issues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 V AND. L. R.Ev. 573, 814-30 (1983) [hereinafter 
Special Project]. Mintz discusses the Robins bankruptcy in At Any Cost at pp. 245-46. 
5. See Brodeur, The Magic Mineral, NEW YORKER, Oct. 12, 1968, at 117. 
6. For another recent book covering much of the same ground, see S. PERRY & J. DAWSON, 
NIGHTMARE: WOMEN AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985). 
7. See P. BRODEUR, AsBESTOS AND ENZYMES (1972); P. BRODEUR, EXPENDABLE AMERI-
CANS (1974). Brodeur has also written several novels, the most noteworthy of which, The Stunt 
Man, was made into a memorable motion picture starring Peter O'Toole. 
8. See M. MINTZ, THE THERAPEUTIC NIGHTMARE (1965) (revised and republished as BY 
PRESCRIPTION ONLY (1967)); M. MINTZ, "THE PILL": AN ALARMING REPORT (1969). 
9. See Swado3, Introduction to YEARS OF CoNSCIENCE: THE MUCKRAKERS at 9, 9-10 (H. 
Swados ed. 1962). 
10. See L. DOWNIE, THE NEW MUCKRAKERS 225, 240 (1976). 
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have generated ample publicity in recent years, 11 information sug-
gesting how these products were able to cause such havoc has emerged 
gradually over a period of time. Brodeur and Mintz piece this data 
together and then draw harsh conclusions from it. 
Outrageous Misconduct takes as its subject a public health hazard 
of mind-boggling proportions.12 The inhalation of dust from raw as-
bestos and products containing the substance (most notably textiles 
and insulation materials) can cause a serious and unique lung disease 
called asbestosis as well as cancers of the lung and chest cavity. It was 
not until Dr. Irving J. Selikoff released the results of his studies of the 
incidence of cancer among asbestos insulation workers in 1964 (p. 31) 
that the potential reach of the asbestos tragedy first came to public 
light. Brodeur's principal thesis is that the Manville Corporation,13 
the world's largest producer of asbestos, and other asbestos marketers 
had reason to know long before 1964 that their products posed serious 
risks to those exposed to them, yet engaged in a massive cover-up 
which kept potential victims behind a veil of ignorance. He also ar-
gues vigorously against any curtailment of the rights of individuals 
harmed by asbestos to recover full tort damages, and hence opposes 
the Manville bankruptcy, proposals for no-fault compensation 
schemes, and federal product-liability legislation favoring corporate 
interests. 
At Any Cost traces the history of a contraceptive device which sub-
jected users to the risk of extensive harm to their reproductive systems 
as well as spontaneous abortions, and is associated with serious birth 
defects in children born to mothers who conceived while wearing it. 
Mintz bases his case study of corporate wrongdoing upon the actions 
of the A.H. Robins Company in purchasing the Dalkon Shield from a 
small firm which had developed it under dubious circumstances, 14 and 
then aggressively marketing it without testing for safety or efficacy;1s 
11. On asbestos, see, e.g., s. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER, 83-93 (1978); J. PAGE & 
M. O'BRIEN, BITrER WAGES, 20-24 (1972); J. STELLMAN & S. DAUM, WORK IS DANGEROUS 
TO YOUR HEALTH, 171-79 (1973). 
On the Dalkon Shield, see Hearings on Regulation of Medical Devices (Intrauterine Contra· 
ceptive Devices) Before the Intergovernmental Relations Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov· 
emment Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter IUD Hearings]; Doubts About IUDs, 
nME, July 15, 1974, at 81; Dowie & Johnston, Case of Corporate Ma/practice, MOTHER JONES, 
Nov. 1976, at 36; see also Ehrenreich, Dowie & Minkin, The Charge: Genocide, MOTHER JONES, 
Nov. 1979, at 26, 28-30 (export of Dalkon Shields). 
12. See note 1 supra. 
13. In 1901 the Manville Covering Company merged with the H.W. Johns Manufacturing 
Company to become the H.W. Johns-Manville Company. P. 13. The company subsequently 
changed its name to the Manville Corporation. P. 249. 
14. The physician who first touted the Shield in the medical literature did not disclose to 
readers that he was part owner of the corporation which held the rights to distribute the device. 
P. 31. Moreover, the substantive claims made by this physician with respect to the Shield were 
dubious. Pp. 31-37. 
15. At that time the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not require approval by the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) before a medical device could be marketed; the FDA could 
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in struggling to conceal or downplay reports of adverse reactions as 
they began to surface; in using questionable tactics in defending prod-
uct liability suits brought by women injured by the Shield;16 and in 
delaying a recall of the product for ten years. · 
Both books go beyond finger-pointing. Mintz sees the Dalkon 
Shield disaster as illustrative of the larger problem of corporate crimi-
nality. Deploring the double standard which permits large companies 
to escape responsibility for conduct which would subject individuals to 
severe criminal sanctions, he suggests strengthening the criminal law 
as a deterrent to behavior such as Robins'. Mintz cites as a positive 
development the conviction of three corporate executives for permit-
ting non-English-speaking employees to work with cyanide to recover 
silver from used X-ray film without warning them of the lethal nature 
of the substance (pp. 253-54). 
Brodeur, like Mintz, mentions the cyanide prosecution in his con-
clusion (p. 349). Yet he discounts its importance, since he sees the 
epidemic of asbestos-related disease as symptomatic of the destructive 
tendencies of the private enterprise system. Ironically, he goes on to 
argue that the best defense against the type of misconduct which pro-
duced the disaster is the private tort suit, which depends upon invest-
ments of time, money, and talent by entrepreneur-lawyers.17 
Neither author hides his indignation. Mintz exercises more re-
straint, although the insensitivity of Robins officials to the suffering of 
Dalkon Shield victims severely tests him. He is able to express strong 
feelings vicariously by making extensive use of the impassioned repri-
mand of three executive officers of Robins delivered in open court by 
Chief Judge Miles W. Lord of the United States District Court for 
initiate enforcement action against a device only if it could be established that the device was 
adulterated or misbranded. 21 U.S.C. §§ 33l(a)-(c), 351, 352 (1970). See generally Davidson, 
Preventative ''Medicine" for Medical Devices: Is Further Regulation Required?, 55 MARQ. L. 
REV. 405 (1972). 
In 1976 Congress enacted medical device amendments which require premarket approval for 
devices such as the Dalkon Shield. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 360-360K (1976)). Both the Senate and House Committee Reports specifically mentioned the 
Shield as a product which had caused harm that could have been prevented if the new law had 
been in effect when it was first marketed. See S. REP. No. 33, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975); 
H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976). 
16. Mintz scores Robins for making unreasonable and irrelevant inquiries into the sex: lives of 
plaintiffs, ostensibly to determine whether unhygienic habits might have caused their diseases, 
but in reality to intimidate women and discourage them from suing the company. Pp. 194-96. 
One of the judges before whom Dalkon Shield cases were tried voiced a similar complaint about 
Robins' conduct. P. 8. 
Pelvic inflammatory disease, however, may result from causes other than intrauterine devices, 
and therefore the causation issue has presented some plaintiffs with considerable difficulty. See 
generally Note, Beyond the Dalkon Shield: Proving Causation Against IUD Manufacturers for 
PID Related Injury, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 639 (1983). As of the end of 1984, Robins 
had won about half the cases which had gone to trial. See Middleton, supra note 2, at 9, col. 1. 
17. On entrepreneur-lawyers generally, see S. SPEISER, LAWSUIT (1980). 
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Minnesota.18 
Brodeur, on the other hand, lashes out sharply and often at those 
whom he views as contributing to the plight of asbestos victims. Doc-
tors who failed to alert the public to the perils of asbestos "were acting 
in the time-honored tradition of the American medical profession, 
whose members, by and large, continue to avoid speaking out on im-
portant matters of occupational and environmental health" (p. 180). 
Senator Gary Hart receives the back of Brodeur's hand repeatedly (to 
the point of redundance) for introducing a "bailout" bill written in 
consultation with Manville lobbyists and setting up a compensation 
system which would cut off Manville's tort liability (pp. 192, 254, 260, 
318). Occasionally Brodeur's rhetoric can be excessive, as when he 
calls legislative efforts to emasculate the common law of products lia-
bility "a perverse and stupid exercise in participatory democracy" (p. 
354). 
Mintz' task is simpler than Brodeur's, in that his subject is more 
manageable. He is dealing with one corporation, one product, a more 
limited group of victims and a relatively brief time frame. Thus, he is 
able to tell his story chronologically, beginning with the invention of 
the Dalkon Shield. This makes At Any Cost easy to grasp for readers 
unfamiliar with the topic. 
On the other hand, Outrageous Misconduct rests upon a much 
more complicated factual predicate. Asbestos has been used for more 
than 4500 years. 19 The Greeks and Romans first observed its harmful 
effects (p. 10). It is a component of a wide range of products. Its 
victims - mainly workers - have come from varied occupations 
which subjected them to different levels of exposures. Cigarette smok-
18. Peter Huber calls Judge Lord's statement an "intemperate charge ••• badly out of touch 
with business reality." He goes on to state that "[i]f corporate officials and lawyers at Robbins 
[sic] had anticipated even a single death or serious injury from sales of the Shield it seems entirely 
obvious that the Company would never have dreamt of marketing the product." Huber, Safety 
and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
277, 319 n.149 (1985). This criticism seems badly out of touch with Judge Lord's actual charge, 
which focused almost exclusively upon Robins' conduct after the device was marketed. The 
statement is reprinted in its entirety in At Any Cost at pp. 264-69. 
Judge Lord attached the text of his reprimand to a notation to the parties' settlement agree-
ment in the case before him. Robins and the three executive officers appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to strike the reprimand from the record. The Eighth Circuit 
found the reprimand improper and ordered it stricken. Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 
1180 (8th Cir. 1984). Robins and the executives also filed misconduct charges against Judge 
Lord before the Judicial Council of the Eighth Circuit. They were dismissed on the ground that 
the ruling of the court in Gardiner had granted appropriate relief. Pp. 236-37. Lord estimated 
that he owed between $70,000 and $100,000 for attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in his 
defense. 
The court's expungement of Lord's denunciation has not succeeded in suppressing it. In 
addition to its reprinting in At Any Cost, it has also been republished, with annotations, in 9 
HAMLINE L. REV. 7 (1986) (issue dedicated to Judge Lord). See also s. ENGELMAYER & R. 
WAGMAN, LoRD'S JUSTICE (1985). 
19. See G. PETERS & B. PETERS, SoURCEBOOK ON AsBESTOS DISEASES: MEDICAL, LEGAL, 
AND ENGINEERING AsPECTS Al (1980). 
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ing greatly increases the risk that an asbestos worker will develop lung 
cancer. Moreover, the ranks of those whose decisions or inaction af-
fected the degree of risk posed by asbestos products include not only 
officials of companies which sold asbestos products, but also insurers, 
physicians, attorneys, labor leaders, and government bureaucrats. 
In substantiating his cover-up indictment, Brodeur opts to relate in 
chronological order not the emergence of facts from which Manville 
and others realized or had reason to realize the degree of risk posed by 
their products, but rather the product-liability suits which brought to 
the surface information with respect to what corporate officials knew 
and when they knew it. He strives for drama by treating the case 
against the industry like a detective story. Incriminating evidence 
gradually unfolds and ensnares Brodeur's targets. 
But the complexity of the asbestos tragedy makes it difficult for the 
lay reader to piece everything together and absorb it coherently. For 
example, the narrative flow does not always differentiate clearly 
among the various kinds of employees exposed to asbestos dust -
miners, textile workers, insulation workers - at various levels of ex-
posure, and between lung cancer and other kinds of pulmonary disease 
caused by asbestos dust. Brodeur does quote extensively from the 
closing argument of plaintiff's attorney Scott Baldwin in Jackson v. 
Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (p. 242), an excellent piece of advocacy 
making the case for punitive damages against Manville and a second 
supplier on behalf of a sheet-metal worker who had been exposed to 
insulation materials in the shipyard where he was employed. 20 But the 
author should have undertaken to deliver his own comprehensive, sys-
tematic, straight-for-the-jugular summation distilling his entire case 
against the asbestos industry. His failure to do so reduces the book's 
persuasiveness. 
II 
Although the general public may find Outrageous Misconduct 
somewhat difficult to digest, Brodeur's detailed descriptions of asbes-
tos product-liability cases and his spirited defense of the tort system 
should interest and challenge readers familiar with tort law.21 There is 
much of value and much with which to take issue in the book. 
20. The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded a judgment for the plaintiff in Jackson. 727 
F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984). On rehearing en bane, the court reinstated a portion of the panel 
opinion and certified questions oflaw to the Mississippi Supreme Court. 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 
1985). The Mississippi Supreme Court declined certification. 469 So. 2d 99 (Miss. 1985). The 
court en bane then affirmed the judgment for plaintiff. 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986). The 
Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986). 
21. The book has evoked polar reactions. Compare Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A 
Story of Asbestos - Carnage, Cover Up, and Litigation (Book Review), 99 HARV. L. REv. 1693 
(1986) (favorable review of Outrageous Misconduct), with Huber, The Risk Race (Book Review), 
THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 3, 1986, at 39 (unfavorable review). 
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His opening salvo is the story of Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products 
Corp., 22 in which an insulation worker won a jury verdict against sev-
eral asbestos suppliers and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit affirmed. As Brodeur notes, this was "the first case in 
the nation to test the applicability of section 402A [of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts] to asbestos-insulation materials,"23 although it did 
not produce the first decision on that point.24 The Borel decision 
opened the way for an onslaught of product-liability litigation against 
the asbestos industry. 
The hero of Brodeur's account of Borel is Ward Stephenson, the 
plaintiff's attorney, to whom he dedicates the book, and who died 
from cancer just before the Fifth Circuit handed. down its decision. 
Stephenson was an East Texas trial lawyer who specialized in repre-
senting workers' compensation claimants injured in jobsite accidents. 
In 1961 he handled his fiist occupational disease claim, on behalf of a 
forty-year-old insulation worker who had developed a serious lung 
problem after two decades of exposure to asbestos materials. Under 
the Texas Workmen's Compensation Law, the maximum recovery for 
permanent total disability at that time was $14,035. Stephenson was 
unable to recover even that pittance for his client. He felt compelled 
to settle the case for only $7500 because of conflicts in the diagnosis of 
his client's illness by the physicians retained by the various parties to 
the proceeding. He then hit upon the idea of bringing a tort action 
against the manufacturers of the insulation materials with which the 
claimant had worked. 
The discrepancy between the statutory amount recoverable under 
workers' compensation and the full tort damages which might be re-
covered for the total (and agonizing) disablement of a forty-year-old 
employee explains the strategic decision made by Stephenson as well 
as by other attorneys representing asbestos victims and facing similar 
limitations upon awards against employers.25 Brodeur digresses to ex-
22. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). 
23. P. 41. Section 402A imposes strict tort liability upon sellers for harm caused by products 
"in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer." RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A (1965). 
24. In Bassham v. Owens-Coming Fiber Glass Corp., 327 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (D.N.M. 
1971), the court stated in dictum that the "physical harm" for which recovery is allowed under 
§ 402A does not include occupational disease. The only support which the court proffered for 
this conclusion was drawn by analogy from a decision of the New Mexico Supreme Court which 
held that occupational disease was not an "injury by accident" and hence was not covered by the 
state's workers' compensation law. See Aranbula v. Banner Mining Co., 49 N.M. 253, 161 P.2d 
867 (1945). However, there is no indication from the text of§ 402A or the comments to it that 
the drafters intended to incorporate judicial interpretations of statutory language totally unre-
lated to products liability. 
25. One academic commentator has averred that plaintiffs suffering from occupational dis-
eases have resorted to common-law suits rather than to workers' compensation because the latter 
is "terra incognita to the ordinary personal injury lawyer" and "tort lawyers simply do not know 
•.. the compensation system." Epstein, Manville: The Bankruptcy of Product Liability Law, 
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plain the origin of workers' compensation coverage of occupational 
illnesses, which were not included in the original bargain whereby 
workers gave up their common-law remedy for full fault-based dam-
ages in return for limited benefits for disability caused by work-con-
nected injuries. 26 The proliferation of negligence claims on behalf of 
workers who had contracted silicosis during the early 1930s prompted 
the industry to lobby for the extension of workers' compensation to 
job-related diseases (p. 18). These amendments provided coverage 
that was limited as well as incomplete (pp. 22-23) and benefits so low 
that they neither compensated workers for more than a fraction of 
their actual loss27 nor provided any real incentives for employers to 
avoid or reduce harmful exposures.28 However, they furnished work-
ers with their exclusive remedy against employers for occupational 
diseases. 29 
Stephenson's third-party tort claim against various asbestos manu-
facturers whose products his client had used led to a modest settle-
ment with five of the companies and a jury verdict in favor of the 
sixth, the Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation. 30 This was a learn-
ing and motivating experience for the attorney. When another sick 
insulation worker walked into his office later that same year, he filed a 
product-liability suit in federal district court against eleven manufac-
turers of asbestos materials to which his new client, Clarence Borel, 
had been exposed. 31 
Stephenson included in his complaint claims based upon negli-
gence, gross negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability. Texas 
had recently recognized strict tort liability as spelled out in section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, but its contours were as 
REGULATION, Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 14, 16, 46. Brodeur amply demonstrates the baselessness of 
this assertion, at least with respect to the attorneys representing plaintiffs in the landmark cases. 
26. See also J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, supra note 11, at 57-58. 
27. See Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REv. 916, 925 
(1980); see also J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, supra note 11, at 65-67. 
28. See Note, supra note 27, at 934. 
The trial judge in a suit brought by employees against Manville for conspiracy and fraud 
declared that Johns-Manville had "chosen to conceal the danger from its employees rather 
than invest funds into finding a safe way of handling the product," and that the company 
had undoubtedly done so because it was less expensive to pay workmen's-compensation 
benefits than to provide a healthy workplace. 
P. 168. The California Supreme Court eventually ruled that the state workers' compensation 
statute did not bar employees from suing an employer in tort for certain kinds of extreme mis-
conduct. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 
948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980). 
29. On the exclusivity of the workers' compensation remedy, see 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW 
OF WORKMEN'S CoMPENSATION § 65.11 (1987). 
30. Brodeur attributes the defense verdict to plaintiff's inability to remember when or on 
which jobs he had used defendant's products. P. 36. 
31. One colorful detail which Brodeur provides explains the style of the case. Stephenson 
had taken a dislike to the attorney who had defeated him in the prior litigation, thus he listed 
Fibreboard as the first defendant, so that the case would bear its name. P. 40. 
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yet ill-defined. The theory Stephenson pursued in Borel was that 
defendants ought to be strictly liable for failing to warn of the dangers 
posed by their products. But plaintiff's further contention was that 
the duty to warn under strict liability applied only to hazards which 
were known or reasonably foreseeable to defendants at the time the 
products were marketed. Thus, plaintiff's burden of proof under strict 
liability was no different from what he would have had to establish in a 
negligence case. Stephenson did not urge that strict liability should 
apply regardless of the knowability of the risk.32 Therefore, the only 
advantage furnished by strict liability would be the avoidance of most 
forms of contributory negligence,33 an important factor in Borel be-
cause defendants asserted this defense as well as assumption of risk.34 
Defendants in Borel relied heavily upon the so-called "state-of-the-
art" defense.35 They contended that until the results of Dr. Selikoff's 
study of asbestos insulation workers became public in 1964, they 
neither had reason to know nor should have known that employees 
ran the risk of lung disease from prolonged exposure to their products. 
Stephenson argued that defendants could and should have known of 
the danger and should have informed Borel about it at a point in time 
when he could have avoided the harm he suffered from his inhalation 
of asbestos dust. 
The jury found that all the defendants were strictly liable in tort, 
all but two of the defendants had been negligent, 36 none of the defen-
dants had been grossly negligent, and Borel had been contributorily 
negligent. The district court entered judgment for plaintiff, and the 
32. In Brodeur's account of the appellate argument made by Dean W. Page Keeton on behalf 
of the defendants, he states that Stephenson "unleashed a wickedly effective attack upon Kee· 
ton's argument by quoting several paragraphs from an article that Keeton himself had written 
about product liability and failure to warn" (p. 67), which advocated the imposition of strict tort 
liability despite the manufacturer's excusable ignorance of the risk. See Keeton, Products Liabil-
ity - Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 398, 407-08 (1970). It is difficult to under-
stand how such a counterargument by Stephenson would have much of an effect, since his strict 
liability count did not seek to impose liability regardless of defendants' knowledge of the danger. 
33. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A comment n (1965) (only form of con-
tributory fault which would be a defense to strict liability is voluntary and unreasonable encoun-
tering of known danger). 
34. Defendants alleged, inter alia, that the decedent negligently failed to wear a respirator 
and to ask his employers to supply blowers. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 
1076, 1098 (5th Cir. 1973). 
35. Use of the term "state-of-the-art" in this context is somewhat ambiguous, since the ex-
pression has been applied both to the degree of scientific awareness of risk and to the level of 
technological feasibility with respect to eliminating or reducing risk. See Page, Generic Product 
Risks: The Case Against Comment k and For Strict Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 877 n.104 
(1983). 
36. The verdict seems to have been inconsistent with respect to the two defendants that were 
found not to be negligent, since the tests used by the court to determine strict liability for failure 
to warn and negligent failure to warn were identical. However, the Fifth Circuit ruled that 
internal inconsistencies in the general verdicts would not require a reversal. Borel v. Fibreboard 
Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1094. 
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Fifth Circuit affirmed. 37 
Brodeur's treatment of Borel differs significantly from that of Pro-
fessor Richard A. Epstein, who sharply criticized the decision in a 
1982 article.38 Brodeur sees the case as exemplifying what is right 
with product-liability law, while Epstein views it as symptomatic of 
what is wrong. Brodeur finds the jury verdict and the holding of the 
Fifth Circuit as deriving irresistibly from the evidence Stephenson 
presented and his artful advocacy. Epstein concludes that the findings 
of fact and ruling of law in Borel were fatally flawed. 
A close scrutiny of Brodeur's account of the trial, as well as the 
Fifth Circuit panel's statement of the facts of the case, suggests that 
the enthusiasm of the author for what he depicts as a one-sided victory 
for the plaintiff is misplaced. The evidence tending to show that 
defendants could have known that exposure to asbestos insulation 
products might cause asbestosis and cancer was barely sufficient at 
best. Stephenson legally established that by the mid-1930s a causal 
link was assumed between exposure to asbestos fibers in textile facto-
ries and asbestosis in textile workers. The only direct evidence point-
ing to early scientific awareness of a link between exposure to 
insulation materials and asbestosis came from an expert witness who 
cited reports of asbestosis in insulation workers which dated back to 
1934. He did not indicate what level of exposure produced the ill-
nesses which had been reported, and admitted on cross-examination 
that very little knowledge existed prior to 1964 to show that the in-
halation of asbestos by insulators was hazardous (p. 47). Stephenson 
also established that the asbestos insulation companies had never done 
tests to determine safe levels of exposures in workers. Defendants 
presented evidence of a 1945 study which concluded that insulation 
workers in United States Navy shipyards did not face an unreasonable 
risk of asbestosis. However, most of the subjects of the study had been 
working in shipyards for less than the period of time after which asbes-
tosis was generally known to manifest itself. The most favorable infer-
ence which might be drawn from this evidence is that asbestos 
suppliers could have had reason to suspect that insulation workers 
might run a risk of serious lung disease from the levels of dust to 
which their jobs exposed them. 
Holding the asbestos manufacturers to the knowledge and skill of 
experts, both the trial judge and the Fifth Circuit recognized that the 
duty of reasonable care which defendants owed encompassed both re-
maining abreast of the latest scientific discoveries and testing products 
37. The court found that decedent neither knowingly nor voluntarily assumed the risk, and 
therefore the defense of contributory negligence in the form of unreasonable assumption of the 
risk, as spelled out in Comment n to § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, would not bar 
recovery. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1096-98, 1106-08. 
38. See Epstein, supra note 25. 
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for potential hazards. On the basis of the knowledge which was avail-
able to defendants and their obligation to test, the appellate court up-
held the jury's finding that the risk could and should have been 
foreseen. 
Epstein finds the Fifth Circuit's summary of the medical evidence 
"one-sided and incomplete, written far more like an over-argued brief 
than a judicial opinion."39 He clearly would have drawn from it infer-
ences favorable to the defendants. However, the issue before the court 
was not what conclusions to draw from the evidence, but rather 
whether there was sufficient evidence to raise a question for the jury. 
The legal rule applied by the court also draws Epstein's fire. He 
argues that during the period within which Borel was using defen-
dants' products, the manufacturers could have had no inkling of the 
duty to which the 1973 decision would subject them. "Before the case, 
the sum and substance of the manufacturer's duty was to make sure 
that its purchasers knew what its product was and perhaps to warn of 
any latent dangers of which it had knowledge but the user and con-
sumer did not."40 In his view, therefore, Borel took the asbestos in-
dustry completely by surprise. He further contends that the obligation 
to test ought to have been placed not upon suppliers but rather upon 
the companies which purchased the substance for processing or other 
uses by employees. 
The unfairness point is dubious. The manufacturer's duty to test is 
at least as old as MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.41 Indeed, in a case 
decided eleven years after Borel Manville asserted as a defense that it 
had begun testing its asbestos-containing products as early as 1929.42 
The first edition of the Restatement of Torts, published in 1934, spelled 
out clearly (and without any "perhaps") the supplier's duty to warn 
not only purchasers but anyone who the supplier might expect would 
use the product.43 There was no reason for the asbestos companies to 
believe that these obligations applied to the sale of products which 
caused personal injury, but put no like burden upon sellers of products 
that might cause diseases. 44 
Epstein is correct when he points out that companies purchasing 
39. Id. at 43. 
40. Id. 
41. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (assembler might be liable to purchaser for negligent 
failure to inspect finished product). On the manufacturer's duty to test, see James, Products 
Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REV. 44 (1955). 
42. See Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1984). 
43. See REsTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 388 (1934). 
44. In a substantial number of jurisdictions the courts had refused to draw this distinction in 
common-law suits by employees against employers. As one commentator noted, "[W]here an 
occupational disease results from the negligence of the employer, thirty states have recognized 
the employer's liability either expressly by allowing recovery or impliedly by denying recovery 
because no negligence was shown." Banks, Employer's Liability for Occupational Diseases, 16 
ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 60, 61 (1943). 
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asbestos had as much access as suppliers to the information introduced 
into evidence in Borel about the possible dangers of the substance. He 
goes on to argue that the legal duty to test ought to have been imposed 
only upon those companies, since they were best suited to conduct 
research on both the harmful properties of asbestos and the levels of 
exposure to which employees might safely have been subjected. One 
may question whether workers' compensation statutes, imposing lim-
ited liability for occupational diseases, provided employers with mean-
ingful incentives to test.45 In addition, Epstein seems to assume that 
the only studies which might have been done were epidemiological and 
related only to tolerance levels for asbestos dust. Yet it is conceivable 
that animal studies might have produced some indication of the haz-
ard. 46 In any event, defendant's misfeasance in Borel was a failure to 
convey to workers an appreciation of the extent of the danger, not a 
failure to reduce asbestos dust to reasonably safe concentrations. 
Both Brodeur and Epstein see Borel as pivotal. According to the 
latter, the "decision completely transformed the law" affecting the lia-
bility of suppliers of asbestos.47 As has been suggested, this characteri-
zation may be somewhat overdrawn.48 Brodeur puts his finger on the 
real significance of the case which "triggered the greatest avalanche of 
toxic-tort litigation in the history of American jurisprudence" (p. 73). 
It demonstrated to plaintiffs' attorneys that suits against asbestos sup-
pliers on behalf of employees of purchasers could be won and provided 
a modem legal framework for pursuing product-liability claims based 
upon workplace exposures. In addition, Stephenson's digging pre-
pared the way for subsequent discoveries which would leave the 
"state-of-the-art" defense in shambles. 
In this latter respect, Outrageous Misconduct tends to undercut 
Epstein. Epstein's analysis of the Borel opinion is solid and interest-
ing, although one may take issue with it. But he goes beyond Borel to 
deplore the wave of product-liability suits which followed Borel and 
inspired the Manville bankruptcy, yet bases his criticism upon the evi-
dence and legal rules which produced the decision in Borel. One must 
read Brodeur to learn the facts which came to light in the post-Borel 
cases and which shifted the focus of the litigation from the supplier's 
failure to test to their failure to disclose (or suppression of) informa-
tion which they actually possessed. 
For example, plaintiffs' attorneys discovered that the medical di-
rector of Canadian Johns-Manville became convinced in the early 
45. See note 28 supra. 
46. One may criticize Borel for not requiring the plaintiff to prove that there were specific 
scientific tests that defendants could have performed and that would have revealed the risk. 
47. Epstein, supra note 25, at 43. 
48. See also Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 
N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 796, 820 n.155 (1983). 
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1950s that insulators and pipe coverers were in danger of developing 
asbestosis (p. 99); that manufacturers of asbestos insulation materials 
owned companies which did insulation contracting, and employees of 
these companies had filed workers' compensation claims for asbestosis 
during the 1950s (pp. 138-40); that researchers had told the Asbestos 
Textile Institute (to which the asbestos suppliers belonged) in 1947 
that the dust level thought to be safe provided no guarantee that work-
ers would not develop asbestosis after prolonged exposures (p. 143); 
that animal tests begun in 1943 revealed that insulation products con-
taining only 15% asbestos could cause lung disease (pp. 148-50); and 
that asbestos insulators settled product-liability suits against Manville 
in 1957 and 1961 (p. 165). 
There was also evidence that Manville systematically withheld 
from its own employees the results of medical examinations which in-
dicated they had contracted lung disease. The manufacturers repeat-
edly put pressure upon medical researchers to delay the publication of 
research establishing the dangers of asbestos and to soften or obscure 
their findings. One of the more ironic discoveries was a suggestion by 
a Manville attorney in 1934 that a researcher tone down the conclu-
sion of a study of asbestos workers because it would hinder a version 
of the "state-of-the-art" defense that was then being asserted by the 
company in tort suits by employees.49 
Thus, the main thrust of the asbestos product-liability suits has 
been that the companies knew of the danger and failed to warn. More-
over, beginning in 1981, plaintiffs began to assert successfully that the 
manufacturers deliberately or wantonly concealed information about 
the perils of asbestos and therefore should be subjected to punitive 
damages.50 
III 
Outrageous Misconduct and At Any Cost cast a positive light upon 
the torts system in its present form. Brodeur asserts that product-
liability litigation is essential both as a preventive weapon against oc-
cupational diseases and as a mechanism to secure adequate compensa-
tion for victims. Mintz is somewhat ambivalent. His prescriptions in 
At Any Cost for the deterrence of corporate malfeasance do not include 
any specific emphasis upon tort law. However, much of the material 
49. P. 114. According to the document, the attorney wrote that "it is only within a compara· 
tively recent time that asbestosis has been recognized by the medical and scientific professions as 
a disease," and that: 
[O]ne of our principal defenses in actions against the company on the common law theory of 
negligence has been that the scientific and medical knowledge has been insufficient until a 
very recent period to place upon the owners of plants or factories the burden or duty of 
taking special precautions against the possible onset of the disease to their employees. 
P. 114. 
50. See generally Special Project, supra note 4, at 690-709. 
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which comprises his case study of the Dalkon Shield comes from evi-
dence that plaintiffs' attorneys unearthed during civil suits against 
Robins (p. x). In his acknowledgement he salutes trial attorneys as "a 
potent check-and-balance against conscienceless corporate power" and 
notes that they "achieve a measure of rough justice. They frequently 
draw press attention that usefully alerts millions of people to hazards 
that otherwise would not come to light ... " (p. ix). 
This latter point is perhaps overdrawn. It seems difficult to believe 
that the dangers of the Dalkon Shield would not have come to light in 
the absence of publicity generated by the filing of product-liability 
suits.51 And the Selikoff study, rather than Borel and its progeny, first 
alerted the public to the asbestos disaster. 
Yet what both books under review demonstrate is the extent to 
which information tending to expose corporate disregard for the 
health and safety of workers and consumers surfaces through the liti-
gation process. The incentives that the torts system provides to pri-
vate attorneys seem to produce results that at the very least are 
complementary (and at best superior) to what is accomplished by 
other methods that society employs to oversee the conduct of mass 
producers.52 This does not mean that better, less costly, and more 
cost-effective mechanisms might not be devised to accomplish this po-
licing task. 53 What it does suggest is that in an imperfect world, re-
ducing the effectiveness of the torts option would increase the 
likelihood that malfeasance such as that described by Brodeur and 
Mintz would remain hidden from public view. 
The action and inaction which produced the asbestos and Dalkon 
Shield disasters occurred despite the prophylactic pressure that prod-
uct-liability law is supposed to exert. One critic has specifically cited 
the failure of the torts process to prevent these tragedies as rather con-
clusive evidence of its futility.s4 
Yet there are other explanations for the patterns of misconduct 
committed by Robins and the asbestos industry. During the 1930s 
and 1940s, the asbestos industry might not have anticipated the emer-
51. The congressional hearings which publicized, inter alia, the hazards of the Dalkon Shield 
do not seem to have been inspired by the filing of torts suits against Robins. See IUD Hearings, 
supra note 11; Hearings on Medical Device Amendments, 1973, Before the Subcomm. on Health of 
the Sen. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
52. Both Brodeur and Mintz have explored the shortcomings of the regulatory agencies that 
failed to detect the misconduct that contributed to the asbestos and Dalkon Shield tragedies. See 
P. BRODEUR, EXPENDABLE AMERICANS (1974); AT ANY COST at 113-27. 
For a discussion of the use of criminal sanctions to deter corporate misconduct in the market-
ing of dangerous products, see Metzger, Corporate Criminal Liability for Defective Products: Pol-
icies, Problems, and Prospects, 73 GEO. L.J. 1 (1984). 
53. See generally Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 555 (1985). 
54. See Abel, Risk as an Arena of Struggle, 83 MICH. L. REV. 772, 788 n.48 (1985). 
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gence of an aggressive plaintiffs' bar55 skilled in the use of newly 
adopted discovery rules56 and willing to share information gleaned 
during trials. 57 And because of the nonrisky nature of the goods that 
they had marketed before the Dalkon Shield came along (nonprescrip-
tion cough medicines, lip balms, and flea collars, for example), Robins' 
officials had no experience at all with products liability. Moreover, 
during the early 1970s they seemed to have been afilicted with a kind 
of "Watergate" mentality which betrayed no glimmer of concern for 
the social consequences of their acts. 58 
In addition, this negative assessment may give too little weight to 
the lesson to be drawn by other companies from the consequences that 
have befallen the asbestos industry and Robins as a result of their mis-
calculations. 59 Under the best of circumstances one may suppose that 
the foreseeable liability costs of a failure to take adequate account (or 
willful disregard) of the potential risks flowing from marketing deci-
sions will encourage manufacturers to make reasonable efforts to pre-
vent or minimize these risks. (On the other hand, it is also conceivable 
that the lesson to be drawn will be to eliminate tangible and possibly 
incriminating evidence of the corporate decisionmaking process so 
that it will not fall into the hands of plaintiffs' attorneys).60 
In highlighting the pluses of the torts process, the books under 
review swim against the current tide. Taking advantage of discontent 
provoked by steep increases in liability insurance premiums, political 
critics of tort law have launched a broad, frontal attack. 61 State legis-
latures have responded by enacting "reform" statutes that curtail the 
rights and remedies of persons seeking compensation for injuries and 
55. See Green, The Thrust of Tort Law: Part I. The Influence of Environment, 64 W. VA. L. 
REV. 1, 19 n.67 (1961); S. SPEISER, supra note 17, at 534-40. 
56. See 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 111126.57-26.60 (2d ed. 1986); 8 c. WRIGHT & A. 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2002 (1970). 
57. For an account of the first systematic effort by plaintiff's' attorneys to pool resources in 
toxic tort cases, see Rheingold, The MER/29 Story - An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster 
Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116 (1968). 
58. In an annotation to his reprimand of Robins' officials, Judge Lord refers to "[w]hat Rob-
ins' former counsel Roger Tuttle has characterized aS a Watergate-type coverup pattern of con-
duct exhibited by Robins with respect to the defense of the Dalkon Shield lawsuits." Lord, The 
Dalkon Shield Litigation: Revised Annotated Reprimand by Chief Judge Miles W. Lord, 9 HAM· 
LINE L. REV. 7, 42 n.28 (1986). 
For details of Robins' most recent miscreancy, see Mintz, Judge Finds A.H. Robins in Civil 
Contempt, Wash. Post, June 15, 1986, at Al, col. 1 (judge in bankruptcy proceeding held corpo-
ration in civil contempt for knowingly violating court orders and flouting both letter and spirit of 
law in making improper payments and transactions). 
59. See Rosenberg, supra note 21, at 1705 n.31. 
60. Mintz devotes'an entire chapter to the suspicious circumstances under which thousands 
of documents sought from Robins by plaintiff's' attorneys disappeared. Pp. 210-27. 
61. A number of recent articles on the tort reform controversy are cited in S. REP. No. 856, 
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 n.27 (1986). For an exchange of views, see Willard, Restore Balance to 
the Tort System, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1986, at 36; Davidson, Drastic Change is Dangerous, A.B.A. 
J., July 1, 1986, at 36. 
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illnesses. 62 The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Trans-
portation reported out a federal bill that seeks to expedite settlements 
of product-related tort claims and standardize miscellaneous aspects 
of the law of products liability.63 Yet this legislation nowhere ad-
dresses the finding of a federal task force that one of the causes of the 
product-liability "crisis" is the marketing of unsafe products.64 
Although the torts system may be necessary as a check upon cor-
porate wrongdoing, in mass tort litigation the point may be reached 
where virtually all the evidence of misconduct has come to light 
through discovery and other mechanisms, and at the same time the 
financial resources available for compensating victims are limited. 
This appears to be the case with both the asbestos65 and Dalkon Shield 
tragedies. 66 
Mintz, preferring a narrower focus upon the issue of corporate 
malfeasance, does not address this issue. Brodeur, on the other hand, 
is implacably opposed to any sort of government intervention that 
would limit victims to less than their full remedy under tort law. 67 
The latter position seems extreme. There may be something to be 
said for holding mass tort defendants liable repeatedly for full com-
pensatory and punitive damages when they continue to deny their cul-
62. See Barron, 40 Legislatures Act to Readjust Liability Rules, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1986, at 
Al, col. 1. These measures include curbs on contingency fees, abolition of joint-and-several lia-
bility, and limitations on recoverable damages. For a trenchant observation on liability caps, see 
NEW YORKER, June 9, 1986, at 33 (cartoon by James Stevenson). For an article expressing 
reservations as to whether these laws are achieving their intended purposes, see Hilder, Insurers' 
Push to Limit Civil Damage Awards Begins to Slow Down, Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1986, at 1, col. 6. 
63. S. REP. No. 856, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). In late September the bill reached the floor 
of the Senate, where it sparked a prolonged and heated debate. Because the legislative session 
was scheduled to end on October 3, Senate majority leader Robert Dole removed the bill from 
the agenda. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1986, at A17, col. 1; see also 132 CoNG. REc. S13,709 
(Sept. 25, 1986). 
64. See U.S. DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, 
FINAL REPORT 1-20, 1-24 to -26 (1978). The other principal causes of the "crisis" were found to 
be liability insurance ratemaking procedures which occasionally might have amounted to "panic 
pricing,'' and uncertainties in the tort litigation system. Id. at 1-20, 1-21 to -24, 1-26 to -29. 
65. When Manville filed for bankruptcy, the company was worth in excess of $1 billion; there 
were 16,500 lawsuits pending against it and nearly 500 new suits were being initiated each 
month. See Chen, supra note 2, at 30. 
66. As of the end of 1984, Robins had paid out more than $300 million to Dalkon Shield 
claimants. The company projected that about 20,000 of the approximately 87,000 women in-
jured by the device would ultimately bring suit. P. 242. On December 31, 1983 the company 
had total assets of slightly more than $500 million. See Kleinfield, Ongoing Problems/or Robins, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1984, at Dl, col. 3. When Robins filed for bankruptcy in 1985, there were 
more than 5100 lawsuits pending against it. Since then, 310,000 women from around the world 
have filed notices of possible claims under a notification plan developed by the bankruptcy court, 
and another 22,000 filed claims after a court-imposed deadline. See Mintz, Dalkon Insurer En-
ters Case, Wash. Post, June 8, 1986, at D7, col. 1. 
For recent critical accounts of the Robins' bankruptcy process, see Goldner, Final Justice for 
A.H. Robins, AM. LAW., Oct. 1986, at 32; Mintz, Dalkon Shield Cases a Legal Quagmire, Wash. 
Post (Business Supp.), Dec. 29, 1986, at 1, col. 1. 
67. Pp. 323-54. See also Meier, The Toxic Journalist, Wall St. J., Apr. 16, 1986, at 31, col. 1. 
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pability and force individual plaintiffs to bear the effort and expense of 
a full trial to prove what has been established many times in the past. 68 
However, a legislative solution that neither applies whitewash nor 
shortchanges victims would appear to be a better approach in situa-
tions where some adjustments must be made to assure fair compensa-
tion for all victims. 69 Such a scheme should not shelve the deterrent 
and punitive functions of tort law. At the very least, public recogni-
tion of blameworthiness should form a part of any statutory compen-
sation plan and should influence its thrust. 
There has been a tendency on the part of some to express alarm at 
the thought that the tort system may visit excessive punishment - the 
fashionable phrase is "overkill"70 - upon corporations responsible for 
mass torts. 71 Outrageous Misconduct and At Any Cost are useful re-
minders of who the real victims of "overkill" are. 
68. On the difficulties in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel to asbestos cases, see 
Special Project, supra note 4, at 659-90. For arguments against using the doctrine offensively to 
benefit asbestos victims, see Wilner, Can An Industry Be Co/laterally Estopped From Litigating 
Product Liability Issues?, 4 J. PROD. LIAB. 189 (1981). See also Schwartz & Mahshigian, Offen· 
sive Collateral Estoppe/: It Will Not Work in Product Liability, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 583 
(1986) 
69. For a critical analysis of proposed asbestos compensation legislation, see Special Project, 
supra note 4, at 780-806. 
70. The term originated in Judge Friendly's opinion in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, 
Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967). Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages 
against a drug company for negligence and fraud in the marketing of an anti-cholesterol medica-
tion that caused cataracts in users. Pointing to a number of similar claims pending against de-
fendant and demanding similar damages for similar injuries, Judge Friendly saw as the solution 
to what he designated as the "overkill" problem in mass tort punitive damage cases the subjec-
tion of plaintiff's proof to an especially strict scrutiny. In the case before him, this led him to 
find that defendant would not be liable for punitive damages. The lesson of Roginsky is that if 
corporate officials want to engage in outrageous misconduct and at the same time avoid liability 
for punitive damages, they should be sure to inflict harm on a grand scale. For a detailed treat-
ment of the entire MER/29 episode, see R. FINE, THE GREAT DRUG DECEPTION: THE SHOCK· 
ING STORY OF MER/29 AND THE FOLKS WHO GAVE You THALIDOMIDE (1972). 
71. See, e.g., Coccia & Morissey, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases Should Not Be 
Allowed, 22 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 46 (1978); Note, Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill, 
30 HAsTINGS L.J. 1797 (1979); Note, Punitive Damages in Mass-Marketed Product Litigation, 14 
LoY. L.A. L. REv. 405 (1981). 
